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A commentary on
The right hemisphere contribution to semantic categorization: a TMS study
by Passeri, A., Capotosto, P., and Di Matteo, R. (2015). Cortex 64, 318–326. doi:
10.1016/j.cortex.2014.11.014
Categorization helps organizing our world knowledge by classifying exemplar concepts into
categories. The degree to which an exemplar is representative of its category is called typicality
(Rosch and Mervis, 1975). Passeri et al. (2015) made the first attempt to assess its effect on
semantic representations in Wernicke’s area (lW) and its right homolog (rW) by interfering on
their online activity with repetitive Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation (rTMS) while participants
categorized typical and atypical exemplars. Responses to typical and atypical concepts were delayed,
respectively, by rTMS over both areas and rW only, supporting the “coarse activation hypothesis”
(Jung-Beeman, 2005), according to which semantic processing is coarser in right (RH) than left
(LH) hemisphere. Despite the authors’ effort to clarify hemispheric contribution to semantic
categorization, their contribution is hindered by some theoretical/methodological limitations that
are worth discussing.
Firstly, the authors interchangeably referred to contrasting semantic memory (SM) theories,
making it difficult to conciliate their hypothesis with them. For example, in saying that “Typicality
effect can be due to [. . . ] features shared or cooccuring between members of a category” (p.
319), they relied on feature-based semantic theories (e.g., McRae et al., 1997; Montefinese et al.,
2014), which suppose a distributed network of featural representations in which typicality reflects
featural intercorrelation (McRae et al., 1999; Montefinese et al., 2015). Contrastingly, in saying
that “Typicality effect can be due to the number, proximity or binding of features” (p. 319), they
relied on the spreading activation theory (Collins and Loftus, 1975), which supposes a somewhat
hierarchical SM structure in which typicality -so-called criteriality- reflects the weight of links
between basic-level and superordinate nodes. However, the authors left this dilemma open by
seeking support in the Beeman’s coarse activation hypothesis and sustaining that hemispheric
differences “can be more simply traced to the different characteristics of the semantic fields and
such an explanation lends itself to account for the effects regardless of any theoretical approach
to the concepts organization” (p. 323). Besides, we would underline that, as far as we know, the
original biological model (Jung-Beeman, 2005) was not integrated with connectionist models of
the SM structure. Regrettably, thus, the authors missed the opportunity to clarify the cognitive
processes implicated and did not provide the reader with adequate information to understand
their (implicit) assumption that the semantic field is comparable to the SM structure and how to
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integrate the typicality (not to say the criteriality or feature
correlation) within Beeman’s theory. More importantly, Passeri
and colleagues hypothesized that “processing of atypical
members, whose features are more weakly or remotely correlated
with other category members and that are more distant from
the category, specifically involves the RH” (p. 320). However,
they did not manipulate either criteriality or feature correlation
but adopted concept-related typicality ratings and production
frequency. Moving from the Passeri et al.’s findings, future
works should try to overcome this limitation by assessing the
effect of these fine-grained measures, as well as that of concept
familiarity, which is known to affect several semantic tasks –
including categorization tasks (Glass and Meany, 1978)– and
shares variance with typicality (Montefinese et al., 2013).
Another critical point concerns the authors’ hypotheses about
RH role in categorization. Indeed, it is unclear how they infer
that rW-rTMS should cause a response times (RTs) slowdown in
atypical concepts categorization (p. 320). Rather, as suggested by
the literature cited (Harpaz et al., 2009), one could make different
predictions. Indeed, Harpaz et al. (2009), which also aimed to
verify the Beeman’s theory (Jung-Beeman, 2005), found more
accurate responses and higher sensitivity to subordinate meaning
blocks following RH-rTMS in a semantic decision task. Thus,
even if Passeri and colleagues derived the trial timeline and rTMS
protocol from Harpaz et al. (2009), they found quite different
results. Nonetheless, the interpretation provided by the authors
for this apparent incongruence was not fully satisfactory. Indeed,
by relying on the fact that Harpaz et al. used a block design, they
called into question putative “expectation effects on the task that
increased the accuracy but nullified difference in RTs” (p. 324).
However, Harpaz et al. found hemisphere-dependent effects on
accuracy/sensitivity, with a clear double dissociation of the rTMS
effect, and thus it is unclear how the rTMS could have modulated
an unspecific expectation effect in a hemisphere-dependent way.
Furthermore, another rTMS study showed that, in a picture-word
matching task, only lW-rTMS delayed participants’ response
times for artifactual compared to natural categories (Fuggetta
et al., 2009).
More importantly, the conclusion drawn by the authors seems
to be not supported by the presented results. Indeed, given
their analytical approach (i.e., the use of four-way ANOVAs),
to claim that the rTMS over rW selectively delayed responses
to atypical member names, as compared to both typical and
non-member names, the crucial TMS-Condition × Typicality ×
Membership interaction should have been significant, but this
was not the case in both by-subjects and by-items full-factorial
ANOVAs. Rather, this conclusion is only supported by a TMS-
Condition×Typicality interaction. However, it makes little sense
to speak about typicality for non-member names, as typicality is
a category-specific measure. Consequently, the authors made “a
statistical error that is common in the neuroscience literature”
(Nieuwenhuis et al., 2011, p. 1105; see also Gelman and Stern,
2006). Indeed, albeit the crucial TMS-Condition × Typicality ×
Membership interaction was non-significant, andwithout further
justifications, Passeri et al. inappropriately performed separate
ANOVAs. More importantly, in doing so they eliminated the
sham (control) condition without justifications. Therefore, the
Passeri et al.’s results should be taken with cautious and
interpreted in light of the fact that their TMS-dependent effects
were not modulated by the exemplar membership and were not
related to an appropriate control condition for non-specific TMS
effects.
To resume, Passeri et al.’s study does not permit disentangling
among competing SM theories for the lack of control over
some semantic/lexical dimensions of conceptual representation
(Montefinese and Vinson, 2015) and of a clear semantic
theoretical framework, impeding to fully appreciate their
innovative contribution. However, it represents a valuable step
toward creating a bridge between semantic and language theories
that could resolve some of the vexing issues in both domains
(Vinson et al., 2014), stimulating further research in this
direction.
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